

# ΥΣ13 - Computer Security

## Web Security

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# Web Application Model



Key topics to understand:

- Protocols
  - HTTP
  - TLS

# Web Application Model



Key topics to understand:

- Authentication
  - Server: **Certificate**
  - User: **SID**
    - Cookies
    - URI / Request content

# Web Application Model



Key topics to understand:

- Browser (aka "user-agent")
  - Session handling
  - Authentication
  - Client-side app. code (javascript)
  - Sandboxing
  - ...

# Web Application Model



Key topics to understand:

- Server
  - Authentication
  - Server-side app. code (script. language)
  - Stateless servers + DB
  - ...

# Web Application Model



Key topics to understand:

- Adversary model
  - Malicious end user
  - Under TLS: can control the network

# Desired properties

- Confidentiality
  - Only Alice can access `https://bank.com/accountinfo?id=alice`
- Integrity
  - Only Alice can access `https://bank.com/transfer?from=alice&to=bob`

Can we guarantee these properties?

# Integrity is hard

- Alice: `https://bank.com/transfer?from=alice&to=bob`



# Integrity is hard

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  - Authentication: SID ok, we talk to Alice's browser
  - TLS: cannot alter the request, we get exactly what the browser sent

# Integrity is hard

- Alice: `https://bank.com/transfer?from=alice&to=bob`
- Can we guarantee **integrity**?
  - Authentication: SID ok, we talk to Alice's browser
  - TLS: cannot alter the request, we get exactly what the browser sent
- But:
  - Does Alice's browser take orders from Alice?

# Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

```
<html>
  Hello Alice , welcome to cutekittens.com, enjoy!

  <iframe
    src="https://bank.com/transfer?from=alice&to=bob"
    style="width:0" >
  </iframe >
</html>
```

What assumptions failed here?

# Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

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# Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

How to fix this?

- Make it impossible to create requests **without knowing the SID**
- SID in URL (problems?)
- Synchronizer token
  - Random
  - Hash-based
- Cookie to header

# Same origin policy

- Does this work? why?

```
console.log(window.top.location.href)
```

```
console.log(window.top.myVar)
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- Modern browsers restrict **cross-domain** access in several contexts
- Iframes
  - Sandboxed javascript environment
  - Communication via `postMessage` (set `targetOrigin!`)



# Same origin policy

- Does this work? why?

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- Modern browsers restrict **cross-domain** access in several contexts
- Iframes
  - Sandboxed javascript environment
  - Communication via `postMessage` (set `targetOrigin!`)
- Ajax
  - CSRF made easy
  - plus, we can now **read the response!**
  - Prevent this in a backward-compatible way: CORS

# Ajax, Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)

```
GET /account?id=alice
```

```
Origin: http://origin.foo
```

```
200: OK
```

```
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST
```

```
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
```

```
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://origin.foo
```

```
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, *
```

# Ajax, Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)

## Pre-flight check

```
OPTIONS /account?id=alice
```

```
Origin: http://origin.foo
```

```
200: OK
```

```
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST
```

```
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
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```
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://origin.foo
```

```
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, *
```

```
DELETE /account?id=alice
```


```
Cookie: ...
```

Be very careful when enabling CORS. **Don't do it blindly** for the whole site!


- Let's reconsider *integrity*
  - Only Alice's browser should access the page
  - Do we *trust* Alice's browser?

- Let's reconsider **integrity**
  - Only Alice's browser should access the page
  - Do we **trust** Alice's browser?
- Goal:
  - **run malicious javascript** code in the context of a **target website**
- Problem:
  - Browsers make it very, very, **VERY** easy to run code
  - Mostly due to the chaotic history of web technologies


# XSS, persistent



# XSS, reflected



# XSS, DOM-based





# SQL injection

```
# authenticate user
$username = $_POST['username'];
$password = $_POST['password'];
$q = "
    SELECT count(*) > 0
    FROM users
    WHERE username = '$username' AND
           password = '$password'
";
```

# SQL injection

Sign in

Email

Password

Stay signed in

# SQL injection

```
... ' ; DROP DATABASE alldata ; --
```

```
... ' ; UPDATE user SET password = '...' WHERE ... --
```

# SQL injection



# SQL injection

Discover the database

```
... ' AND 1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM guessed_name); --
```

```
... ' AND guessed_name.field = ''; --
```

Solutions

## Solutions

- Data-only contexts
  - `innerText` vs `innerHTML`
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- Escape
  - `&lt;script&gt;...&lt;script&gt;`
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## Solutions

- Data-only contexts
  - `innerText` vs `innerHTML`
  - Prepared SQL statements
- Escape
  - `&lt;script&gt;...&lt;script&gt;`
  - Beware of the context!
- Filter
  - Can be very tricky

## Separate code from data

```
$stmt = $mysqli->prepare(  
    "SELECT * FROM myTable WHERE name = ? AND age = ?"  
);  
$stmt->bind_param("si", $_POST['name'], $_POST['age']);  
$stmt->execute();
```

# File Inclusion

- Local or remote
- Check carefully what you require